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Incidents at U.S. onshore hazardous liquid pipeline systems were analyzed with an emphasis on natural
hazards. Incidents triggered by natural hazards (natechs) were identiﬁed by keyword-based data mining
and expert review supplemented by various data sources. The analysis covered about 7000 incidents in
1986e2012, 3800 of which were regarded as signiﬁcant based on their consequences. 5.5% of all and 6.2%
of the signiﬁcant incidents were found to be natechs that resulted in a total hazardous substance release
of 317,700 bbl. Although there is no trend in the long-term yearly occurrence of signiﬁcant natechs,
importance is found to be increasing due to the overall decreasing trend of the incidents. Meteorological
hazards triggered 36% of the signiﬁcant natechs, followed by geological and climatic hazards with 26%
and 24%. While they occurred less frequently, hydrological hazards caused the highest amount of release
which is about 102,000 bbl. The total economic cost of signiﬁcant natechs was 597 million USD, corre-
sponding to about 18% of all incident costs in the same period. More than 50% of this cost was due to
meteorological hazards, mainly tropical cyclones. Natech vulnerabilities of the system parts vary notably
with respect to natural hazard types. For some natural hazards damage is limited possibly due to
implemented protection measures. The geographical distribution of the natechs indicated that they
occurred more in some states, such as Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana. About 50% of the releases was to
the ground, followed by water bodies with 28%. Signiﬁcant consequences to human health were not
observed although more than 20% of the incidents resulted in ﬁres. In general, the study indicated that
natural hazards are a non-negligible threat to the onshore hazardous liquid pipeline network in the U.S. It
also highlighted problems such as underreporting of natural hazards as incident causes, data
completeness, and explicit data limitations.
© 2016 European Commission Joint Research Center. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access
article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The pipeline network in the U.S. consists of 4.3 million km of
pipes, more than 300,000 km of which is transporting hazardous
liquids. The majority of hazardous liquids are crude oil, reﬁned
petroleum products, and other highly volatile liquids (HVLs) that
are transported from producers and processors to industrial or
commercial intermediate and end users mostly via large-diameter
underground steel pipes (PHMSA, 2014c). Natural hazards, such as
earthquakes, ﬂoods, and landslides, can be initiating events for
accidents in pipeline systems with potentially adverse conse-
quences on the population, the environment, and the economy
including major supply chains. Accidents in which the natural andGirgin).
ch Center. Published by Elsevier Ltdtechnological worlds collide, leading to the release of hazardous
materials, ﬁres or explosions are commonly referred to as natech
accidents (Showalter and Myers, 1994; Krausmann et al., 2011a).
Numerous severe accidents bear testimony to the risk associated
with natechs related to pipeline systems. The March 5, 1987
earthquake in Ecuador (Ms 6.9) caused the destruction of more
than 40 km of the Trans-Ecuadorian oil pipeline due to massive
debris ﬂows following the earthquake. Approximately 100,000 bbl
oil spilled to the environment and the loss of revenue during the
ﬁve months required for repair was 800 million USD, equal to 80%
of the total earthquake losses (NRC, 1991). The San Jacinto River
ﬂooding in Texas, U.S. in October 1994 led to the rupture of several
pipelines by the ﬂoodwaters. 34,500 bbl of crude oil and petroleum
products were released into the river and ignited. Besides signiﬁ-
cant environmental damage, 547 people suffered inhalation prob-
lems and burns (NTSB, 1996b). The hurricanes in 2005 and 2008
that struck the Gulf of Mexico affected not only offshore but also. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/
S. Girgin, E. Krausmann / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 40 (2016) 578e590 579onshore facilities and severely damaged the oil and gas industry in
the region including pipeline operators due to strong winds, storm
surge and ﬂooding (DoE, 2009).
The analysis of historical incident data is important for identi-
fying the main causes, failure modes, related impacts, and statis-
tical trends of such accidents (Montiel et al., 1996; Papadakis, 1999).
This allows a better understanding of incident mechanisms and
helps the preparation of prevention and mitigation measures. In
the U.S., incident reports collected by the Department of Trans-
portation's Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration
(PHMSA) provide comprehensive data for this purpose (PHMSA,
2013a). Providing detailed information on natural gas and haz-
ardous liquid pipeline system incidents, these reports can be used
to identify pipeline natechs in the U.S. and to determine their dy-
namics and consequences. Although there are studies that evaluate
the PHMSA incident data in general (Restrepo et al., 2009; Wang
and Duncan, 2014), natech-speciﬁc studies do not exist.
In this study, onshore hazardous liquid pipeline system in-
cidents reported to the PHMSAwere analyzed with an emphasis on
natural hazard triggers. A database-driven incident data analysis
system was developed to aid the categorization and review of the
incident reports. The natech incidents were identiﬁed using a
keyword-based automated data-mining process followed by an
expert review of the reports, which were supplemented with
additional information sources. Identiﬁed natechs were analyzed
statistically for long-term trends, geographical distribution, trig-
gering natural hazard types, involved system parts, damage and
impact modes, type and amount of released substances, economic
costs, and other consequences.
This article describes the data collection and reviewing phases
of the study, and presents the ﬁndings of the statistical analysis. The
results are limited to onshore hazardous liquid transmission pipe-
line systems and do not cover offshore, gas, or distribution pipe-
lines. The results of similar analyses for other pipeline systems,




The PHMSA administers the U.S. national regulatory program to
assure the safe transportation of hazardous materials by pipeline.
Regulated industries have to report loss of containment incidents
which meet reporting criteria deﬁned by the PHMSA's pipeline
safety regulation (49 CFR 191/195). Incident reports include infor-
mation such as location and cause of the incident, system charac-
teristics including involved items and operating conditions, type of
physical damage, type and amount of substance released, envi-
ronmental and human health-related consequences, economic
losses, and emergency response and remediation activities. Haz-
ardous liquid transmission and natural gas transmission, gathering,
and distribution incident reports are available since 1968 and 1970,
respectively. Incidents involving hazardous liquid pipeline systems
for the period 1968e2012 were covered in this study. The total
number of incidents included is 11,758.
U.S. National Response Center (NRC) hazardous substance spill
reports were utilized to supplement PHMSA data. NRC is the point
of contact for reporting all discharges of dangerous substances into
the environment in the U.S (NRC, 2013). More than 800,000 NRC
reports covering the period of 1982e2012 were included in the
study. Reports cover spills not only from pipeline systems but also
other sources, however only pipeline-related records were utilized.
The included data covers date, location, involved substance,
released quantity, and description of the incidents which usuallyincludes the cause and type of system involved.
U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) disaster
declarations were used as natural disaster data to aid the identiﬁ-
cation of natechs (FEMA, 2013). About 3200 declarations covering
the period 1968e2012 were included in the study. The included
data covers the time period, location, and short description of the
disasters.
The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) storm database was also used to provide natural hazard
data (NOAA, 2013). The database includes storms and other
weather phenomena with sufﬁcient intensity to cause loss of life,
injuries, signiﬁcant property damage, or disruption to commerce.
Rare or unusual phenomena that generate media attention are also
covered. About 900,000 storm database records for the period
1968e2012 were included in the study.
In addition to these primary resources, scientiﬁc and technical
documents, newspaper articles and on-line resources were also
utilized as additional information sources for selected incidents.
The collected data was stored in a relational database speciﬁcally
designed for the study (Girgin and Krausmann, 2014). The database
allows triggering events (natural hazards), natechs (incidents), and
information sources (e.g. spill reports) to be systematically
compiled and related to each other in a tree-like structure. Inter-
related hazards and incidents can also be indicated (Fig. 1).
2.2. Data review
The PHMSA reports are publicly available as 4 different datasets
for the periods 1968e1985, 1986e2001, 2002e2009, and
2010eonwards (PHMSA, 2013b). Because each dataset has a
different format, the available data is not uniform and the data
quality also varies. Recent datasets are richer in content and
generally better in quality. In most of the datasets, natural hazard-
related incidents are grouped under natural force damage in the
cause section and detailed narratives giving insight into the in-
cidents are also available. The PHMSA data features temperature
(freeze, frost heave, thermal stress), earth movement (earthquake,
subsidence, landslide), heavy rains/ﬂoods (ﬂotation, mudslide),
lightning, and high winds as sub-causes of the natural force dam-
age cause.
For 1968e1985, the incident cause section does not include
natural hazards and incident narratives are also not available. For
selected incidents it was possible to identify natechs from the in-
formation provided in external references and cross checking with
natural hazard records. However, a systematic classiﬁcation of
natechs was not possible. Consequently, only the incidents that
occurred in the period 1986e2012 were further studied.
A preliminary analysis involving cross checking of incident
causes with available narratives for this period showed that there
are incidents which were originally not classiﬁed as natural hazard
related but were actually triggered by natural hazards. To identify
such incidents and determine the uncertainty of the existing data, a
comprehensive data review was conducted. A data analysis system
was developed on top of the study database to be able to system-
atically classify, review, and further analyze the available data. The
analysis system provided tools for quick data query, automated data
mining and classiﬁcation, review and statistical analysis. It also
facilitated making necessary corrections to the records, entering
supplementary information (e.g. study notes, bibliographic cita-
tions, tags), and creating links between related records through
user-friendly interfaces (Girgin and Krausmann, 2014).
In order to review the data, onshore incidents explicitly listed as
natural hazard related were classiﬁed into a uniﬁed set of natural
hazards according to designated natural hazards in the related
PHMSA data ﬁelds. The remaining incidents were automatically
Fig. 1. Record relations in the study database.
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mining process. For this purpose, natural hazard-speciﬁc keywords
were determined by examining narratives of previously classiﬁed
natech incidents. Additional keywords that are synonyms of the
determined keywords were collected from the WordNet lexical
database (Fellbaum, 1998). All keywords were converted into
keyword patterns supporting partial matching of words with
wildcard characters. To classify the incidents, the system analyzed
the textual contents of the incident reports to ﬁnd outwhether they
matched natural-hazard speciﬁc keyword patterns or not. In case of
a match, the natural hazard of the matching incident was set
accordingly and the incident itself was designated as a natech
incident. In case of multiple matching patterns, the natural hazard
having the highest ranking was used. The list of natural hazards,
their ranking and the complete list of keyword patterns used for the
classiﬁcation can be found in Girgin and Krausmann (2014).
Subsequently, all identiﬁed natech incidents were manually
reviewed by at least two experts to correct possibly misclassiﬁed
incidents. During this process, NRC spill reports were also auto-
matically classiﬁed and reviewed in addition to the PHMSA data to
identify the spills related to natech events. The comprehensive
classiﬁcation of the records allowed the analysis system to high-
light possibly related records in the data sources used. This facili-
tated the linking of records which was carried out manually by the
experts. The identiﬁed relevant NRC reports were used to supple-
ment the matching PHMSA reports either by completion of missing
information or veriﬁcation of the available data. Similarly, FEMA
and NOAA natural hazard records were used to clarify and verify
the triggering natural hazards of the natech incidents. Furthermore,
both spill and natural hazard records were also used to control
incidents which were originally indicated as not natural hazard
related, but having a possibility to be natural hazard related. For
this purpose, all incidents which occurred in the same geographical
region within a certain time period of the natural hazard records
and natech-related spill reports, were identiﬁed. These incidents
were reviewed manually to check for evidence of natural force-
related causes or impacts. If credible evidence was found, they
were classiﬁed as natech incidents. It should be noted that during
the review of the NRC reports, additional hazardous liquid pipeline
system incidents were identiﬁed that did not match any of the
existing PHMSA incidents. Such incidents were not taken into
consideration for this study.
During the review, incidents which were triggered by natural
hazards were designated as natechs. Incidents that involvesecondary causes related to natural hazards or transport of sub-
stances by natural forces that were released due to other causes
were not regarded as natech incidents. However, releases due to
external impacts caused by natural hazards, such as debris carried
by ﬂood waters or fallen utility poles due to strong winds, were
considered as natechs. Frequently observed natural hazard contri-
butions to non-natech incidents are sweep of released substances
by heavy rain, ﬂash ﬂood, or storm surge, containment dam over-
ﬂow or failure due to heavy rains, and hindrance of emergency
response and clean-up operations.
For some incidents, it was not possible to determine with cer-
tainty the type of natural hazard trigger, although they were re-
ported as natural force-related. In some other cases, it was not
possible to assign the exact natural hazard although it was certain
that the incident was caused by natural forces (e.g. reported as
ground movement by natural forces). Uncertainty ﬂags were used
for such incidents in order to indicate the data reliability.
Missing data in the incident records were completed during the
review from the available information in the incident narratives or
by referring to other sources. Some data ﬁelds occasionally missing
in the original data were geographic coordinates, involved item,
type of damage, and release medium. Missing geographic co-
ordinates were determined approximately by using address
description or township/range information, if available. The U.S.
National Pipeline Mapping Systemwas used to verify the locations,
where applicable (PHMSA, 2014b). Information about the release
medium, which was completely missing in the dataset for
1986e2001, was completed for all natechs based on the incident
narratives and NRC reports.2.3. Data analysis
The identiﬁed onshore hazardous liquid pipeline system
natechs were analyzed statistically for long-term trends, triggering
natural hazards, involved system parts, pipeline characteristics,
natural hazard impact and damage modes, type and quantity of
released substances, release mediums, human health conse-
quences, and economic damage.
A preliminary analysis of the long-term trend in the incident
data showed that the data is not uniform through the study period
and has a sudden increase in the number of incidents starting from
2002, which coincides with a change in the reporting criteria
(Fig. 2). During 1986e2012, the reporting criteria were changed
Fig. 2. Yearly trend of signiﬁcant and insigniﬁcant incidents.
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substances. In 1994, the cost criterion for reporting estimated
property damage to the operator or others was increased from
5000 USD to 50,000 USD and clean-up, recovery and product loss
costs were included. Lastly, in 2002, the minimum reporting
quantity was decreased to 5 gallons with special exemption con-
ditions for spills with less than 5 bbl (PHMSA, 2011). Although the
ﬁrst two changes did not signiﬁcantly affect the number of reported
incidents, the last change increased the number about 3 fold and
also changed the composition of the dataset for the last decade.
In order to eliminate the effect of changing reporting criteria
and distinguish signiﬁcant incidents, PHMSA utilizes the following
criteria for long-term trend analysis:
 5 bbl HVL or 50 bbl non-HVL release
 50,000 USD total costs, measured in 1984 USD
 Fatality or injury requiring in-patient hospitalization
 Unintentional ﬁre or explosion
The same criteria were used in this study to differentiate sig-
niﬁcant natechs and to obtain a consistent dataset suitable for
statistical analysis (Fig. 2).
It should be noted that the actual number of signiﬁcant in-
cidents and natechs could be higher due to the under reporting of
release quantities and economic cost estimates as illustrated in the
following section. However, for the current analysis this is not taken
into consideration and values as published by PHMSA are used
unless stated otherwise.
For the analysis, 5 systempart categories were used to assess the
vulnerability of different parts of pipeline systems:
 Pipeline: line pipe including valve sites
 Aboveground storage: aboveground storage vessels and breakout
tanks including attached equipment
 Belowground storage: equipment and piping related to below-
ground storage Station: equipment and piping related to pump and meter sta-
tions excluding storage units
 Terminal: equipment and piping related to terminals and tank
farms excluding storage units
Because the original system part deﬁnitions were not consistent
during the study period, system parts of some natechs were
manually assigned based on event narratives. Cross-checks were
carried out based on location information by using high-resolution
satellite imagery.
In order to analyze the distribution of natechs with respect to
the type of hazardous substance transported, 4 different substance
categories were utilized:
 Crude oil
 Non-HVL reﬁned and/or petroleum products which are liquid at
ambient conditions
 HVL or other ﬂammable or toxic ﬂuids which are gas at ambient
conditions
 Carbon dioxide (CO2)
Similarly, release media were grouped under 3 main categories:
ground (including dikes and secondary containments), water
(including streams, channels, ponds, lakes, and bays), and
atmosphere.
The PHMSA data provides not the actual, but estimated costs of
the incident losses. As mentioned earlier, the reporting criteria
considered emergency response, environmental remediation,
product loss, and other costs from 1994 onwards. However, the
reporting data format did not include separate ﬁelds for these costs
until 2002 and only the total costs were reported in 1994e2001.
Therefore, total economic losses were used for the analysis to
provide a common baseline. Costs were adjusted for inﬂation by
using annual gross domestic product price indices published by the
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. For reasons of consistency with
the summary statistics published by PHMSA, all values were
S. Girgin, E. Krausmann / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 40 (2016) 578e590582adjusted for 2013 currency by using the index data for the ﬁscal
year 2010 (BEA, 2010).3. Results
For a period of 27 years (1986e2012) that covered 6982 onshore
incidents, 387 incidents (5.5%) were found to be natech events
(Table 1). In the original dataset, only 76% of these incidents were
indicated as natural hazard related. 24% of the natechs were iden-
tiﬁed by the automated classiﬁcation and expert review. This in-
dicates that the existing PHSMA incident cause descriptions do not
fully represent the actual causes in case of natural hazards,
resulting in an underestimation of the natech incidents. 62% of the
additionally identiﬁed natechs were from the 1986e2001 period.
Hence, the accuracy is higher in the later datasets.
60% of the identiﬁed natechs are among the signiﬁcant in-
cidents. Unlike for the total number of incidents, no step increase is
observed in the yearly time series of the natechs (Fig. 3). The dis-
tribution of signiﬁcant natechs also does not have a statistically
signiﬁcant trend, although an overall decreasing trend is observed
in the occurrence of signiﬁcant incidents (Fig. 2). This results in a
slightly increasing trend in the ratio of the signiﬁcant natechs to the
signiﬁcant incidents. As design standards, construction quality and
operating practices of pipeline systems improve, other types of
incidents seem to decrease in number, and incidents due to natural
hazards become more important.
Data for the 2002e2012 period allows the assessment of the
status of insigniﬁcant natechs. In this period, there are 94 signiﬁ-
cant and 121 insigniﬁcant natechs (Table 1). Although their number
is higher, the total quantity of released substance (609 bbl) and the
total cost of damage (2.7 million USD) of the insigniﬁcant natechs
correspond to less than 0.5% of the signiﬁcant incidents. Therefore,
a detailed analysis of the consequences of natechs was carried out
solely for the signiﬁcant incidents. Only in certain instancesTable 1
Yearly summary of onshore hazardous liquid pipeline system incidents and natechs (198
Year
Num. Incidents Num. Signiﬁcant Incidents
Incident Natech % Incident Natech %
1986 207 9 4.3 192 7 3.6
1987 237 6 2.5 215 6 2.8
1988 190 8 4.2 165 5 3.0
1989 161 15 9.3 135 8 5.9
1990 175 4 2.3 137 4 2.9
1991 214 13 6.1 165 12 7.3
1992 207 7 3.4 165 6 3.6
1993 224 11 4.9 152 11 7.2
1994 241 34 14.1 176 21 11.9
1995 184 15 8.2 154 14 9.1
1996 189 11 5.8 171 9 5.3
1997 162 6 3.7 154 6 3.9
1998 142 11 7.7 132 11 8.3
1999 160 5 3.1 142 4 2.8
2000 138 7 5.1 128 6 4.7
2001 124 10 8.1 104 10 9.6
2002 453 14 3.1 129 7 5.4
2003 430 21 4.9 122 8 6.6
2004 364 21 5.8 125 11 8.8
2005 351 28 8.0 120 12 10.0
2006 345 11 3.2 104 5 4.8
2007 329 20 6.1 107 10 9.3
2008 368 22 6.0 119 6 5.0
2009 336 15 4.5 107 9 8.4
2010 346 27 7.8 119 12 10.1
2011 344 18 5.2 138 8 5.8
2012 361 18 5.0 125 6 4.8
Total 6982 387 5.5 3802 234 6.2reference is made to the insigniﬁcant natechs for comparison pur-
poses. Also for the 2002e2012 period, the yearly average of the
ratio of the number of signiﬁcant natechs to all natechs (44%) is
considerably larger than the same ratio of the incidents (33%). This
suggests that natechs tend to bemore severe (i.e. signiﬁcant) events
than other incidents in terms of consequences.
3 natechs among the incidents marked as not signiﬁcant by
PHMSA were found to fulﬁll the signiﬁcance criteria according to
the incident narratives. These natechs were included in the analysis
as signiﬁcant natechs, except for the long-term comparison of in-
cidents and natechs.3.1. Major natech incidents
Major natechs with respect to total economic cost and release
quantity are listed in Table 2. The table covers all natechs that
resulted in more than 2 million USD total economic damage or
more than 2000 bbl hazardous substance release. None of the in-
cidents in 1986e1993 have total costs high enough to be listed in
the table, mainly because the costs included only the property
damage. In fact, there is only one natech from this period with an
adjusted reported cost greater than 1 million USD, which is the
Brazos River ﬂooding incident that occurred on June 7, 1991, near
Knox City, Texas. Flooding water eroded the river bank, washed out
the pipeline, and the stress of excessive water ﬂow and debris
caused an acetylene girth-weld failure releasing about 6250 bbl
crude oil. The oil spreadwidely in the ﬂood-plain areas over 240 km
along the river. The reported costs due to property losses were 2.2
million USD, however the total cost is likely to be higher due to
extensive oil-restraining and clean-up activities that took place
after the incident, and which were not reported.
There are two natechs with a total cost greater than 50 million
USD. The ﬁrst one was due to the impact of Hurricane Katrina on a
terminal facility located in Plaquemine, Louisiana on 29 August,6e2012).
Sig. Total Release (103 bbl) Sig. Total Cost (106 USD)
Incident Natech % Incident Natech %
276.8 6.0 2.2 27.5 1.1 3.9
395.6 31.4 7.9 23.3 0.9 3.7
183.8 2.2 1.2 55.4 0.2 0.4
201.5 14.9 7.4 13.3 0.5 3.8
122.8 4.1 3.4 24.2 0.4 1.8
200.2 15.6 7.8 57.1 3.9 6.9
133.8 7.6 5.7 53.4 0.1 0.2
115.8 6.1 5.3 39.7 1.2 3.1
159.7 57.9 36.3 88.7 52.0 58.6
109.9 9.1 8.3 44.2 18.0 40.7
153.6 5.9 3.8 117.7 0.6 0.5
190.1 5.2 2.7 58.7 2.3 3.9
139.4 3.2 2.3 71.0 6.5 9.1
163.7 5.5 3.4 112.6 0.9 0.8
106.3 5.1 4.8 173.3 2.8 1.6
98.0 31.4 32.0 29.9 2.6 8.7
95.6 0.3 0.3 58.8 0.4 0.7
80.0 5.4 6.7 79.3 2.8 3.6
76.3 12.2 16.0 100.9 24.1 23.9
136.0 65.2 47.9 320.1 253.5 79.2
135.9 0.4 0.3 63.8 7.9 12.5
94.7 3.9 4.1 62.2 0.6 1.0
101.0 1.9 1.8 142.8 13.0 9.1
52.4 2.4 4.7 63.2 9.0 14.2
99.7 4.2 4.2 1045.5 38.1 3.6
88.3 7.1 8.0 269.6 149.0 55.3
45.0 3.5 7.8 141.3 3.8 2.7
3755.9 317.7 8.5 3337.6 596.3 17.9
Fig. 3. Yearly trend of signiﬁcant and insigniﬁcant natechs.
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off and the foundation of another was ripped out (Sever, 2006).
About 23,600 bbl crude oil was spilled, most of which was con-
tained on-site where it naturally dispersed. The rest of the oil was
contained by using mechanical booms and cleaned up with skim-
mers and in-situ burning. The reported estimated total cost of the
incident was 175 million USD. The second incident was a crude oil
spill in the Yellowstone River in Laurel, Montana, which occurred
on July 1, 2011. The pipeline was exposed during ﬂood and high
water conditions that persisted for more than a month and failed at
the girth weld as a result of external loading caused by ﬂood con-
ditions (Katchmar, 2012). About 1500 bbl crude oil were spilled into
the river resulting in an estimated total cost of 140 million USD.
These two natechs are among the top three of the most costly
pipeline system incidents from all causes within the study period.
The only non-natech incident that resulted in a higher cost is the
Kalamazoo River oil spill that occurred on July 25, 2010 near
Marshall, Michigan, which resulted in a spill of 20,000 bbl diluted
bitumen with an estimated total cost of 813 million USD (NTSB,
2001).
It should be noted that the reported costs were sometimes
incomplete or inaccurate in the PHMSA dataset. For example, the
cost of a pipeline rupture due to a landslide in Freeport, Pennsyl-
vania on March 30, 1990 that resulted in the release of about 1800
bbl of mixed petroleum products into the Ohio River was reported
as zero. The spilled products entered a small creek emptying into
the Allegheny River and eventually the Ohio River, resulting in
extensive ground and water pollution and interrupting the use of
the Allegheny River as a water supply for several communities.
According to the NTSB special investigation report, damage to the
pipeline and environmental clean-up and restoration costs excee-
ded 19.5 million USD (12 million USD in 1990) (NTSB, 1996a). This
cost alone is two times more than the overall reported cost of all
natechs in 1986e1993. Similarly, the release of more than 2150 bbl
of crude oil on October 8, 1994, into the Gum Hollow Creek that
eventually entered Nueces and Corpus Christi Bays and impactedsigniﬁcant portions of existing freshwater and estuarine habitats,
was reported to have zero cost. However, to settle two lawsuits
related to the spill, the operator agreed to paymore than 66 million
USD (45 million USD in 1994) (Associated Press, 2001). Solely with
this ﬁgure, the incident should have been the third most costly
natech in 1994e2012, however it was listed as one of the least
costly ones. The uncertainty of the cost ﬁgures reported in the
PHMSA dataset seems to be high, therefore they should be treated
with caution.3.2. Natural hazards
The overall distribution of signiﬁcant natechs in 1986e2012
with respect to natural hazards is given in Table 3. The main natural
hazard category triggering natechs is meteorological hazards with
36% contribution. Geological hazards are the second most impor-
tant category with 26%, followed by climatic and hydrological
hazards with 24% and 14%, respectively. Within geological hazards,
subsidence is the major hazard with 32% contribution, the second
being frost heavewith 27%. Natechs grouped under other geological
hazards were caused by rocks resting on pipelines. They are found
to be signiﬁcant and are more frequent than landslides. Although
considered a major geological hazard for pipeline systems, there
are only 6 incidents triggered by earthquakes and all of them were
due 1994 Northridge Earthquake (Mw 6.7). Among meteorological
hazards, lightning caused the highest number of incidents with 58%
share. 20% of the incidents in this category were due to heavy
rainfall, followed by storms and tropical cyclones with 7% contri-
bution each. High winds, tornadoes, and winter storms caused the
least number of incidents. As for hydrological hazards, 81% of the
incidents were due to ﬂooding and the remaining due to stream
erosion/scouring during normal ﬂow conditions. It should be noted
that based on the available data it was not always possible to
differentiate washouts during normal ﬂow conditions from those
during ﬂooding conditions. Therefore, the actual distribution can be
slightly different although the number of natechs under
Table 2
Major natechs with respect to release quantity and total economic cost (1986e2012).














1986/09/07 TX Petr. Cond. Str. erosion Pipeline 800 1965 External impact Weld failure Stream No 3.0 <0.1
1987/05/30 OK Crude Oil Flood Pipeline 2400 1949 Washout Weld failure Stream No 19.2 0.6
1987/06/29 CO NGL Subsidence Pipeline 1000 1981 Ground shift Pipe failure Air No 10.0 <0.1
1989/06/07 OK Fuel Oil Flood Pipeline 800 1946 Ext. loading þ Debris imp. Weld failure Stream No 2.7 0.1
1989/06/13 TX NGL Flood Pipeline 600 1968 Debris impact Pipe failure Stream No 10.5 0.2
1991/06/07 TX Crude Oil Flood Pipeline 1000 1946 Washout > Debris impact Weld failure Stream No 6.2 2.2
1991/06/14 OK Crude Oil Lightning Station e 1962 Direct hit Overﬂow Ground No 5.3 <0.1
1992/02/06 NE Gasoline Freeze Storage e 1957 Ice expansion Nipple failure Dike No 2.9 e
1992/07/10 TX Crude Oil Lightning Pipeline 1000 1927 Eq. malfunc. > Overpressure Weld failure Ground No 3.0 <0.1
1993/07/26 NE Ammonia Flood Pipeline 600 1968 Debris impact Pipe failure Stream No 2.2 0.2
1994/01/17 CA Crude Oil Earthquake Pipeline 1000 1925 Ground movement Rupture Stream No 4.2 17.5
1994/01/17 CA Crude Oil Earthquake Pipeline 1000 1925 Ground movement Circum. rupture Ground No 0.6 2.3
1994/01/17 CA Crude Oil Earthquake Pipeline 1000 1925 Ground movement Circum. rupture Ground Yes 0.6 2.3
1994/01/21 KS Diesel Fuel Frost heave Pipeline 800 1929 Ground movement Rupture Stream No 3.9 3.4
1994/09/11 TX Kerosene Heavy rain Storage e 1977 External load Deﬂected roof Contain. No 5.0 <0.1
1994/10/08 TX Crude Oil Lightning Pipeline 1000 1948 Direct hit Pipe failure Bay No 2.2 e
1994/10/20 TX Gasoline Flood Pipeline 4000 1979 Washout (new bed) Rupture Stream Yes 20.0 14.6
1994/10/20 TX Diesel Fuel Flood Pipeline 3600 1962 Washout (new bed) Pipe failure Stream Yes 10.0 e
1994/10/21 TX Crude Oil Flood Pipeline 2000 1948 Washout (new bed) Rupture Stream Yes 5.4 6.6
1994/12/20 LA Gasoline Flood Pipeline 2000 1944 Washout Pipe failure Stream No 3.2 1.5
1995/03/11 CA Crude Oil Flood Pipeline 1800 1969 Washout > Debris impact Circum. rupture Stream No 4.0 14.3
1995/06/07 OK Crude Oil Flood Pipeline 800 1969 Washout >External load Weld failure Stream No 2.5 0.9
1996/02/08 MO Butane Cold weather Pipeline 1000 1930 Temp variation Weld failure Air No 3.0 0.1
1998/10/19 TX Crude Oil Heavy rain Storage e 1945 External load Sunken roof Stream No 1.0 3.4
1999/11/02 MI NGL Other geo. Pipeline 3000 1954 Resting rock Dent crack Air Yes 5.3 0.3
2000/02/03 TX Crude Oil Subsidence Pipeline 2600 1962 Ground movement Flange failure Ground No 4.0 0.3
2001/04/01 ND Ethylene Frost heave Pipeline 1200 1977 Ground movement Pipe failure Air Yes 27.7 1.1
2001/06/09 TX Diesel Fuel Heavy rain Storage e 1948 External load Sunken roof Contain. No 2.5 0.1
2003/01/26 NC Diesel Fuel Freeze Station e 1994 Ice blockage Piping failure Ground No 2.1 0.7
2004/01/25 NY Propane Frost heave Pipeline 800 1963 Ground movement Tap failure Air Yes 6.2 0.4
2004/09/16 LA Crude Oil Trop. cyclone Storage e e Direct hit Tank damage Gulf No 3.1 17.7
2004/09/16 OK Crude Oil Lightning Storage e e Direct hit Tank ﬁre None Yes e 2.8
2005/01/26 KY Crude Oil Subsidence Pipeline 2200 1950 Ground movement Circum. rupture Stream No 6.9 9.9
2005/02/01 PA Gasoline Cold weather Pipeline 800 e Ice formation Valve failure Ground Yes 1.1 5.9
2005/03/23 CA Crude Oil Landslide Pipeline 1400 1950 Ground movement Circum. rupture Lake No 3.4 15.8
2005/08/29 LA Crude Oil Trop. cyclone Terminal e e Storm surge > Ext. impact Piping failure Stream No 1.3 4.1
2005/08/30 LA Crude Oil Trop. cyclone Storage e e High wind > Direct hit Tank damage Ground No 23.6 175.4
2005/09/02 LA Crude Oil Trop. cyclone Pipeline 2000 1958 Storm surge >Washout Rupture Stream No 3.2 17.8
2005/09/02 LA Crude Oil Trop. cyclone Storage e e Direct hit Floor damage Stream No 25.4 22.0
2006/06/12 OK Gasoline Lightning Storage e 1971 Direct hit Tank ﬁre None Yes e 6.7
2007/01/29 CO Crude Oil Freeze Storage e 2006 Ice expansion Gasket failure Dike No 3.1 0.1
2008/06/03 KS Gasoline Lightning Storage e 1950 Direct hit Tank ﬁre None Yes e 10.5
2009/04/24 OH Propane Lightning Pipeline 1200 1973 Direct hit Puncture Ground No 0.2 2.5
2009/12/23 LA Crude Oil Flood Pipeline 1600 1965 Scouring Pinhole leak Water No <0.1 4.7
2010/01/11 LA Butane Cold weather Pipeline 600 2000 Thermal stress Pipe failure Air No 2.2 0.2
2010/06/12 UT Crude Oil Lightning Pipeline 1000 1952 Direct hit Pinhole leak Stream No 0.8 33.8
2011/07/01 MO Crude Oil Flood Pipeline 1200 1990 Washout > External load Circum. rupture Stream No 1.5 139.7
2011/08/13 IA Gasoline Flood Pipeline 800 1993 Washout > External load Circum. rupture Stream No 0.7 7.9
2011/12/27 TX Propane Subsidence Pipeline 800 1928 Sinkhole Weld failure Air No 3.3 0.2
2012/07/21 TX Ethylene Lightning Pipeline 1000 1968 Nearby hit > Ext. impact Fire impingement Air Yes 3.1 1.2
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freeze is the major hazard with 72% of the incidents followed by
cold weather. Overall, cold weather-related hazards make up 91% of
the natechs triggered by adverse climatic conditions. The remain-
ing were due to hot weather and droughts.
In general, distribution of insigniﬁcant natechs with respect to
natural hazards is similar to the signiﬁcant natechs, except hydro-
logical hazards for which all observed natechs were signiﬁcant
(Table 3). Freeze is the major natural hazard causing almost one
third of the insigniﬁcant natechs, followed by heavy rain, frost
heave, and tropical cyclones with more then 10% contributions. In
addition to the insigniﬁcant incidents listed in Table 3, there are
also 40 more insigniﬁcant incidents which were indicated as nat-
ural hazard-related in the PHMSA dataset. But related natural
hazards could not be determined due to limited information.3.3. System parts
The analyzed data shows that 46% of the signiﬁcant natechs
occurred at pipelines, i.e. at the line pipe including valve sites.
Natechs involving aboveground storage units correspond to 30% of
all natechs, followed by stations and terminals by 16% and 8%,
respectively. Only one signiﬁcant belowground storage natech was
identiﬁed.
The distribution of natechs with respect to system part differs
between signiﬁcant and insigniﬁcant incidents. In 2002e2012,
signiﬁcant natechs occurred more frequently at pipelines and
aboveground storage units (66%) compared to stations and termi-
nals (34%). In contrast, insigniﬁcant natechs often took place at
terminals and stations (61%) instead of aboveground storage units
and pipelines (39%). The distribution of natechs with respect to
system part is also highly natural hazard dependent (Table 3).
Table 3









Fire Release Environment System Part
Atm. Soil Water Fire Pipeline Storage Station Terminal
Earthquake 7 6 6.1 22.6 1 e 5 1 e 6 e e e
Landslide 1 8 10.2 19.3 e 1 2 5 e 8 e e e
Subsidence 2 20 27.0 3.1 e 5 12 3 e 14 1 3 1
Frost heave 14 17 41.4 7.8 3 5 11 1 e 7 2 5 3
Other geological 5 11 6.8 4.4 2 1 5 5 e 11 e e e
Geological 29 62 91.5 57.2 6 12 35 15 e 46 3 8 4
Heavy rainfall 17 17 10.4 11.0 e e 12 4 1 e 13 2 2
Tropical cyclone 13 6 56.8 237.8 e e 1 5 e 1 3 e 2
Storm 3 6 0.6 0.3 1 2 4 e e e 2 3 1
Winter storm 1 2 0.6 0.8 e e 1 1 e e 1 e 1
High wind 2 3 0.6 <0.1 e 2 1 e e 1 e 1 1
Tornado e 2 0.2 <0.1 e 1 1 e e e 1 1 e
Lightning 5 50 19.4 69.1 38 12 12 3 23 16 23 10 1
Meteorological 41 86 88.6 319.1 39 17 32 13 24 18 43 17 8
Flood e 26 101.9 202.7 3 e e 26 e 26 e e e
Stream erosion e 6 7.9 4.9 e e e 6 e 6 e e e
Hydrological e 32 109.8 207.6 3 e e 32 e 32 e e e
Hot weather 1 3 0.4 0.1 e e 3 e e e e 3 e
Cold weather 4 11 9.7 0.8 e 2 7 2 e 6 3 1 1
Freeze 35 41 17.4 11.1 2 3 35 3 e 4 21 9 7
Drought e 2 0.4 0.5 1 e 2 e e 2 e e e
Climatic 40 57 27.8 12.5 3 5 47 5 e 12 24 13 8
Total 110 237 317.8 596.4 51 34 114 65 24 108 70 38 20
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and climatic hazards. The vast majority (76%) of the heavy rainfall
natechs hit aboveground storage units. Incidents involving above-
ground storage units were also the highest by number for freeze
and lightning natechs. However, for these hazards there were also
signiﬁcant numbers of incidents in other system parts. Although
the percentages change slightly, stations and terminals showed a
similar pattern with respect to the overall distribution of the nat-
ural hazards. For these system parts, the involvement of geological
hazards was around 20%. Meteorological hazards had the same
frequency with climatic hazards for terminals (40%), whereas for
stations they were slightly more frequent (45%). For the pipelines,
geological hazards were the primary trigger with 43% share, fol-
lowed by hydrological hazards and meteorological hazards with
30% and 17%, respectively. Hydrological hazards triggered natechs
only at pipelines. Similarly, natechs due to earthquake, landslide,
resting rock, and drought were observed only at pipelines. Subsi-
dence events also mostly affected the pipelines, although a small
number of related natechs also occurred at other system parts.3.4. Release quantities
Signiﬁcant natechs resulted in 317,700 bbl of hazardous mate-
rials releases in 1986e2012, whereas the total release of all sig-
niﬁcant incidents was 3,755,900 bbl. Therefore the overall natech
contribution is 8.4%. The distribution of yearly total natech releases
shows that for the majority of years the total amount was less than
10,000 bbl (Table 1). There are only 4 years with a total release
greater than 20,000 bbl, which are 1987, 1994, 2001, and 2005. For
all these years except 1987, natechs constituted more than 30% of
the incident releases that occurred in that year.
The distribution of natechs with respect to hazard categories
based on release quantities shows that hydrological hazards was
the major category with 35% (Table 4). Geological and meteoro-
logical hazards had similar contributions with approximately 30%each, while climatic hazards caused only 8% of the releases. The
natural hazard resulting in the highest amount of release was
ﬂooding with 101,900 bbl, followed by tropical cyclones with
56,800 bbl. Within geological hazards, frost heave and subsidence
were the most signiﬁcant hazards with respect to release quanti-
ties. They were also third and fourth most signiﬁcant overall.
Because of their low number of occurrence, high wind, winter
storm, tornado, hot weather and drought incidents resulted in
insigniﬁcant amounts of releases (Table 3).
Most of the natech releases occurred at pipelines with 221,300
bbl of total release, followed by aboveground storage units with
79,500 bbl. Releases from stations and terminals were found to be
signiﬁcantly lower. 50% of the releases from pipelines were due to
hydrological hazards, followed by geological hazards with 40%. The
contribution of meteorological and climatic hazards was about 5%
each. In contrast, more than 80% of the releases from aboveground
storage units were due to meteorological hazards. Similarly, 63% of
the releases from stations was also meteorological. Hydrological
hazards did not cause any release at system parts other than
pipelines. Climatic hazards were about 17% and geological hazards
were very minor for aboveground storage units. These hazard
categories had slightly higher contributions for stations, which
were 24% and 13%, respectively. Climatic hazards has the highest
share at terminals with more than half of the releases, whereas
meteorological hazards were about 40%. There was a minor
contribution from geological hazards.3.5. Economic damage
In the 1986e1993 period, which only included property dam-
age, the total cost of signiﬁcant natechs was 8.3 million USD,
whereas for all signiﬁcant incidents it was 293.9 million USD. The
natech contribution for this period is 2.8%. For the 1994e2012
period, for which the data included product loss, clean-up, and
recovery costs in addition to property damage, the total cost of
Table 4
Summary of signiﬁcant natechs with respect to system part and hazard category (1986e2012).
System Part
Num. Signiﬁcant Total Release (103 bbl) Total Cost (106 USD)
Geo. Met. Hyd. Cli. Tot. Geo. Met. Hyd. Cli. Tot. Geo. Met. Hyd. Cli. Tot.
Pipeline 46 18 32 12 108 87.8 14.8 109.8 9.0 221.3 54.8 58.3 207.6 7.7 328.5
Aboveground Storage 3 43 e 24 70 2.0 64.1 e 13.4 79.5 0.7 252.4 e 1.2 254.3
Pump/Meter Station 8 17 e 13 38 1.6 8.1 e 3.1 12.8 0.8 1.9 e 2.6 5.3
Terminal/Tank Farm 4 8 e 8 20 0.1 1.7 e 2.3 4.1 0.9 6.4 e 1.0 8.3
Total 61 86 32 57 236 91.5 88.6 109.8 27.8 317.7 57.2 319.1 207.6 12.5 596.4
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same period was 3043.7 million USD. Therefore, the natech
contribution is 19.3%. The difference in the contribution mainly
originates from natechs that occurred in certain years, which are
1994, 1995, 2004, 2005, and 2011. For the majority of the years, the
total natech costs are less than 10 million USD (Table 1).
Meteorological hazards were found to be the major natural
hazard category with respect to economic cost and resulted in 319.1
million USD total damage. Damage due to hydrological hazards
corresponded to one third of the total cost, whereas geological
hazards had slightly less than 10% contribution (Table 4). Climatic
hazards resulted in only 12.5 million USD total damage. Within
meteorological hazards, tropical cyclones had the major contribu-
tion with 237.8 million USD, followed by lightning events causing
more than 69 million USD of total damage. Almost all the costs of
hydrological hazards were due to ﬂoods (202.7 million USD), which
was the second most costly natural hazard after tropical cyclones
(237.8 million USD). Earthquakes had the highest share within
geological hazards, followed by landslides and frost heave. Among
climatic hazards, freeze is the leading natural hazardwith a share of
89% in terms of costs (Table 3). Almost all cost of the natechs
involving aboveground storage units were due to meteorological
hazards, mainly tropical cyclones. Meteorological hazards also
resulted in the most damage at terminals. Among the natechs
involving pipelines, themajority of the cost was due to hydrological
hazards, followed by meteorological and geological hazards.
Damage and losses due to climatic hazards at pipelines was
comparatively not signiﬁcant. However, climatic hazards were the
major hazard category for stations with 50% contribution.
The analysis of detailed cost data available for 2002e2012
shows that the property damage costs correspond to only 20% of
the total incident costs. Remediation (35%) and emergency
response (26%) costs were more signiﬁcant. However, for the
natechs in the same period, the total property cost had the highest
share with 46%. Costs of product loss and remediation activities
were found to be insigniﬁcant but emergency response costs were
high with 35%. 76% of the total property cost was due to a single
natech, which was the terminal facility incident due to Hurricane
Katrina in 2005 mentioned before. Apparently, for this incident all
cost values except the property damage were reported as zero,
which gives the impression that the total cost estimate couldn't be
divided into categories and was reported as a single ﬁgure
resulting in an imbalance in the cost data. If this incident is
excluded, the total contribution of property damage for all natechs
reduces to 14%. Overall, it can be concluded that the property costs
are only a fraction of the incident costs and hence the incidents in
1986e1993 should not be considered as less signiﬁcant in the
economic sense due to their low total reported cost, which only
include property damage.
3.6. Geographical distribution
Geographic distribution of the natechs is given in Fig. 4. The
ﬁgure shows that the natechs are concentrated in a few states of theU.S. Number of signiﬁcant natechs, total amount of release, and
total economic damage with respect to the hazard categories for
selected states are given in Table 5. The table includes the states
fulﬁlling at least of the following criteria: 4 signiﬁcant natechs,
2500 bbl of total release, or 2 million USD total economic cost.
Among these states, Texas had the highest number of incidents
corresponding to 27% of all signiﬁcant natechs. Texas is followed by
Oklahoma (10%), Louisiana (7%), California (6%) and Kansas (6%).
More than half of the natechs occurred in these 5 states. Because
the occurrence of incidents is also a function of the pipeline
network density, it is not possible to attribute the high number of
natechs solely to the natural hazard susceptibility of these states. In
fact, a comparison of incident and natech occurrence ratios of the
states shows that there is no signiﬁcant difference between the
occurrence patterns. States with the highest number of natechs also
had the highest number of incidents.
The majority of the states experienced a total release of less
than 10,000 bbl. There were 4 states with more than 20,000 bbl of
release, which were Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and North
Dakota. In Texas and Oklahoma, the main hazard causing releases
was ﬂooding. For Louisiana, the triggers were almost completely
meteorological involving tropical cyclones, whereas geological
hazards were the main hazards in North Dakota. Geological haz-
ards caused themain proportion of releases in California, Colorado,
Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Pennsylvania,
and Wyoming. In addition to Louisiana, meteorological hazards
were also the main release trigger in Alabama. In Iowa and Ken-
tucky, hydrological hazards caused most releases, whereas in
Missouri and Nebraska the major natural hazard contribution was
from climatic hazards. While Texas has the highest number of
incidents, in terms of economic losses it is outranked considerably
by Louisiana (247 million USD), Montana (141 million USD), and
California (55 million USD). The economic damage experienced in
Texas was only 42 million USD, which was mainly due to hydro-
logical and meteorological hazards. It is followed by Utah with 34
million USD damage, all due to meteorological hazards. These 5
states altogether constituted about 88% of the total natech cost.
Meteorological hazards were the main contributor in Kansas and
Oklahoma. In Kentucky and Iowa, most of the economic losses was
due to the hydrological hazards, whereas in Pennsylvania it was
climatic hazards.
3.7. Substance type
47% of the natechs by number involved the release of crude oil,
followed by non-HVL and HVL incidents with 35% and 17% contri-
butions, respectively. CO2 related incidents were only 1% of all
natechs. Because the lengths of the pipeline systems of different
substances are not equal, a direct comparison of the number of
incidents is not feasible. Mileages by hazardous liquid category are
available only starting from 2004 (PHMSA, 2014a). Therefore, a
historical comparison of annual incident rates for different sub-
stance categories is not possible for the whole study period.
However, taking the time-series of the annual mileage for the
Fig. 4. Geographical distribution of natech incidents (1986e2012).
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using the proportional mileage information for different substance
categories in 2004e2012 as a reference, average annual natech
occurrence rates per 1000 km of pipeline are estimated as 0.053,
0.032, 0.018, and 0.024/year /103 km for crude oil, non-HVL, HVL,Table 5
Regional summary of signiﬁcant natech incidents (1986e2012).
State
Num. Signiﬁcant Total Release (103 b
Geo. Met. Hyd. Cli. Tot. Geo. Met.
Alabama e 4 e e 4 e 0.6
California 11 1 1 1 14 11.5 <0.1
Colorado 1 1 e 3 5 10.0 <0.1
Illinois 2 3 1 5 11 0.3 2.1
Iowa e 2 3 4 9 e 0.3
Kansas 3 6 2 3 14 5.6 0.5
Kentucky 2 e 1 e 3 1.8 e
Louisiana 2 9 4 2 17 0.1 56.9
Michigan 2 e e 2 4 5.3 e
Minnesota 7 1 e e 8 2.9 0.5
Missouri 3 2 e 1 6 1.4 0.2
Montana 3 1 1 1 6 2.9 0.1
Nebraska e e 2 2 4 e e
New York 1 1 e e 2 6.2 0.1
N. Dakota 2 e e e 2 27.7 e
Ohio 1 4 e 1 6 0.1 0.3
Oklahoma 3 7 7 8 25 1.6 5.8
Pennsylvania 2 3 e 2 7 1.8 <0.1
Texas 9 34 10 10 63 11.0 20.4
Utah e 1 e e 1 e 0.8
Virginia 2 1 e 1 4 0.1 <0.1
Wyoming 1 e e 3 4 0.7 e
Total 57 80 33 49 219 91.0 88.6and CO2 pipelines, respectively. The overall value for all natechs is
0.034/year /103 km for 261,275 km average annual length of the
hazardous liquid pipeline network in the U.S.
A comparison of signiﬁcant and insigniﬁcant natechs in the
period 2002e2012 showed that the percentages insigniﬁcantbl) Total Cost (106 USD)
Hyd. Cli. Tot. Geo. Met. Hyd. Cli. Tot.
e e 0.6 e 1.8 e e 1.8
4.0 0.2 15.7 40.4 0.7 14.3 0.1 55.5
e 3.5 13.5 <0.1 0.1 e 0.1 0.2
0.1 0.8 3.3 <0.1 3.0 e 0.8 3.8
1.3 0.8 2.4 e 0.5 8.0 0.7 9.2
2.1 1.5 9.6 3.6 10.6 <0.1 0.3 14.5
6.9 e 8.7 0.5 e 9.9 e 10.4
3.6 2.2 62.9 0.2 239.9 6.3 0.4 246.7
e 0.2 5.5 0.5 e e 0.4 0.8
e e 3.4 2.8 0.2 e e 3.0
e 3.0 4.6 0.3 <0.1 e 0.1 0.4
1.5 0.4 4.9 1.3 <0.1 139.7 <0.1 141.1
2.3 3.0 5.3 e e 1.2 <0.1 1.2
e e 6.3 0.4 0.4 e e 0.7
e e 27.7 1.6 e e e 1.6
e 0.3 0.6 0.1 2.7 e <0.1 2.8
29.4 2.1 38.9 0.4 10.9 2.6 0.1 14.0
e 1.3 3.1 0.1 0.2 e 7.2 7.6
58.6 4.6 94.6 1.9 13.3 25.6 1.1 41.9
e e 0.8 e 33.8 e e 33.8
e <0.1 0.1 0.2 <0.1 e 0.1 0.3
e 0.5 1.2 0.7 e e 0.1 0.8
109.8 24.4 313.7 55.0 318.1 207.6 11.5 592.1
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However, HVL natechs tend to bemore signiﬁcant (75%) rather than
insigniﬁcant (25%) by number. 46% of the HVL natechs involve
gasoline, whereas 39% involve other liquid fuels such as diesel, fuel
oil, kerosene, and jet fuel. 8% of the released substances aremixture
of reﬁned products (e.g. transmix) and the remaining 7% includes
other non-HVL products. Among HVLs, liqueﬁed petroleum gases
(LPG) and natural gas liquids (NGL) are the most frequently
observed released substances with a combined 85% contribution.
10% of the HVL natechs involve anhydrous ammonia and the
remaining 5% are other HVLs.3.8. Pipe characteristics
Nominal pipe sizes of the pipelines affected by natural hazards
show a right-skewed distribution. 32% and 20% of the natechs
occurred at 800 and 1000 pipes respectively, while the majority with
74% were between 600 and 1200. The number of natechs was very low
for all pipe sizes between 1200 and 4000, except 2400 and 2600 which
has a slight increase. There is no observable difference between the
pipe size distributions for different natural hazard categories,
except climatic hazard related incidents which were not observed
in the pipelines above 1000. The situation was also similar with
respect to substance type.
The distribution of the pipe age of the natechs involving pipe-
lines is slightly right skewed towards the pipes aged between 20
and 29 years with a distribution mean of 40e49 years. The number
of natechs involving very old (70 years) and relatively new (<20
years) pipes are low. The majority of the pipes involved in natechs
are in the age range of 20e49 years. In general, pipe age distribu-
tions with respect to natural hazard categories are not found to be
different and exhibit the same shape. With respect to substance
type, incidents involving crude oil have occurred comparatively
more frequently in older pipes, whereas non-HVL and HVL in-
cidents involve medium aged and relatively new pipelines,
respectively.3.9. Release medium
48% of the natechs resulted in releases to the ground including
into dikes and secondary containments. Releases to inland water
bodies and sea correspond to 28%, whereas releases to the atmo-
sphere were 14%. The released substance was directly consumed by
ﬁre in the remaining 10% of the natechs, resulting in zero net
release to the environment (Table 3). Hydrological hazards resulted
in releases only to thewater environment, which was inmost of the
cases streams. For climatic natechs the major release medium was
ground. Although for geological and meteorological natechs the
main release medium was also ground, atmospheric releases and
spills to water bodies were also common. All natechs with zero net
release due to ﬁre consumption were meteorological, more spe-
ciﬁcally lightning incidents, except one case which was related to
heavy rain (Table 3).
With respect to system part, incidents involving body of pipe
resultedmainly releases to water bodies with 50%. For other system
parts release to thewaterwereminor and themain releasemedium
was the ground. For aboveground storage tanks the second release
type was zero net release with 30% contributionwhile atmospheric
releases were very rare. With respect to substance type, crude oil
and non-HVL substances show a similar pattern in which the ma-
jority of the releases were to the ground, followed by about 30% of
releases to water, and the remainder with zero net release. All HVL
releases were to the atmosphere, except for 22% of the releases that
occurred at river crossings.3.10. Damage and impact modes
About 55% of the natechs involving pipelines resulted in pipe
rupture, whereas the remaining 35% and 10% were leaks and
component failures at valve sites, respectively. Ruptures were
dominant for hydrological and geological hazards, while leaks were
more frequently observed for meteorological and climatic hazards.
All earthquake and landslide natechs, and the vast majority of ﬂood
and subsidence natechs resulted in ruptures. In contrast, all resting
rock and the majority of the lightning natechs involved leaks. For
other hazards, such as storm, tropical cyclone, freeze, and drought,
the numbers of incidents was insufﬁcient for drawing statistically
meaningful conclusions.
The observed impact modes of natural hazards on different
pipeline system parts are diverse and highly speciﬁc to the type of
natural hazard. Although the PHMSA dataset includes natechs
triggered by various natural hazards, it does not cover all natural
hazard-related damage and impact modes (Hann et al., 1997).
Frequently encountered natech damage and impact modes are as
follows:
All earthquake-related failures, which were due to the 1994
Northridge Earthquake, were ruptures and cracks at acetylene
welds of a pipeline constructed in 1925. The failures are attributed
to the welding method and inadequate construction standards of
the time. In fact, two other pipelines exposed to the same earth-
quake forces in the epicenter area, which were constructed after
1950 with better welding methods (arc welding), did not sustain
any damage (NIST, 1997). The impact mode of rocks resting on
pipelines was denting followed by pinhole leaks or hairline cracks.
In some cases rocks were moved underneath the pipelines by
ground movement due to frost heaving.
All heavy rain natechs at stations and terminals involved sump
overﬂow due to rain waters and ﬂash ﬂoods. Heavy rain-related
natechs that affected aboveground storage units were usually
caused by excess pressure exerted on ﬂoating roofs due to accu-
mulated rain water. Partially or completely sunken roofs were
common. Although they were seldom, tank ﬂoatation resulting in
tank bottom failure was also observed. All storm natechs involved
electrical storms which resulted in equipment failure or malfunc-
tion due to power loss or electromagnetic inﬂuence. Releases were
generally in the form of sump/tank overﬂow due to pump or con-
trol equipment-related problems, or leaks and ruptures due to
overpressure caused by malfunctioned control or relief systems. In
case of winter storms, the observed impact modewas snowweight.
In one case, accumulated snow caused the ﬂoating roof of an
aboveground storage tank to sink and in the other case it resulted in
the failure of a ﬁtting. The impact modes observed in high wind
natechs were impact of debris (e.g. boards) carried by the winds
and the falling of nearby structures (e.g. power poles) due to
excessivewind forces. Similar impact modes were also observed for
tornadoes. Tropical cyclones involved combined effects of heavy
rain and wind events. More structural damages were observer due
to stronger forces exerted during cyclonic conditions. Lightning
natechs involve tank ﬁres due to direct hit of aboveground, mainly
ﬂoating roof, storage tanks, small leaks from pinholes due to elec-
trical arcs, equipment failure/malfunction due to direct hit or po-
wer loss due to nearby hit. Equipment-related damages usually
resulted in overpressure in the pipeline system and subsequent
pipe rupture at a different location.
Natechs due to hot weather were caused by thermal stress and
sun pressure. Cold weather-related natechswere alsomainly due to
thermal stress, usually caused by signiﬁcant temperature varia-
tions. Four impact modes were identiﬁed for freeze natechs, which
are ice expansion (74%), ice formation (13%), falling ice/snow (8%),
and frozen components (5%). Expansion of ice during freezing was
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components. Ice formation was found to have caused component
malfunction and blockage of auxiliary pipes. Water naturally pre-
sent in the transported substance is the main source of ice, but
residual water from hydro-testing of the pipeline system also
caused several incidents. Falling ice/snow resulted in cracks at the
pipeline system components, whereas freeze mostly caused
component malfunction leading to releases. Two natechs involving
drought occurred in December, 1995 near Palo Pinto, Texas.
Extended drought conditions allowed the ground to shift, causing
collar joint failures along the same pipeline at different dates.
3.11. Human health
There were no fatalities due to natechs in 1986e2012. 1851 in-
juries were reported due to three pipe breaks during the San Jacinto
River ﬂooding near Harris, Texas on 20 October, 1994. However, the
NTSB incident investigation report indicates that only 547 people
received injuries (NTSB, 1996b). The injuries were due to the sig-
niﬁcant amount of petroleum product that caught ﬁre and moved
downstreamwith the ﬂooded stream. They were minor smoke and
vapor inhalation complaints, except two cases that involved serious
burns. Probably due to the discrepancy in the reported numbers,
the total number of injuries of these three events are excluded from
the ofﬁcial PHMSA summary statistics (PHMSA, 2014d). One person
was injured due to the crude oil spill after the Northridge Earth-
quake in the City of San Fernando into the Los Angeles River that
caught ﬁre on its course along the river. This injury is also
mentioned in the NIST report related to lifeline performance and
post-earthquake response (NIST, 1997). Although it was not
numerically indicated in the incident data, the narrative of a pe-
troleum condensate spill due to stream erosion that occurred on
September 7, 1986 at the Red River crossing near Cooke, Texas,
mentions about medical treatment of about 14 people. Newspaper
articles on that day also support this information (Associated Press,
1986).
17 natechs were reported to have involved evacuations of the
public, residential areas, and schools nearby the incidents. It is not
possible to give an exact ﬁgure because the number of evacuees
was not provided in all cases, but about 1000e1500 people are
estimated to have been evacuated due to natechs.
3.12. Fire and explosion
There are 51 natechs which resulted in ﬁre (Table 3). 75% of the
ﬁre incidents were due to lightning and the contributions of other
natural hazards were comparatively insigniﬁcant. Lightning in-
cidents also differ from other natechs with a very high frequency of
ignition, which is also observed in gas pipeline networks (EGIG,
2011). The occurrence of ﬁres did not show any dependency with
respect to substance type. However, they occurred more frequently
at aboveground storage tanks (45%) and pipelines (31%). In addition
to ﬁres, explosions were also reported for 11 natechs. However, the
available incident narratives do not include any information about
explosions in more than 60% of these incidents although these in-
cidents were ﬂagged as explosion related in the PHMSA dataset.
4. Discussion
The analysis of the identiﬁed natechs showed that natural
hazards are a non-negligible threat to onshore pipeline systems
transporting hazardous liquids in the U.S. Although they occurred
less frequently than incidents from other causes, their conse-
quences are comparativelymore serious than the other incidents as
shown by the high amount of economic damage despite a notablylower natech incidence. A higher ratio of signiﬁcant natechs to all
natechs compared to the ratio of signiﬁcant incidents to all in-
cidents also supports this conclusion.
The signiﬁcant number of natech incidents additionally identi-
ﬁed during the review indicates that there was a tendency to
under-report natural hazards as causes of incidents. Although
natural hazards can be indicated as causes in the incident reporting
forms, incidents triggered by natural hazards are not always
properly reported as natural-hazard related. Although for some
cases it is difﬁcult to correlate incidents to natural hazards, some
misclassiﬁcation can be solved by providing proper guidance.
The analysis showed that natural hazards do not impact all
pipeline system parts equally and some parts are more susceptible
to speciﬁc natural hazards. Damage and impact modes were also
signiﬁcantly different for different system parts, especially if the
impacted item is a component like a valve, pump, or control
equipment. Therefore, while studying the natural hazard impact on
pipeline systems, different system parts should be addressed
separately, especially if the study involves the historical analysis of
incident data including consequences.
Aboveground facilities of pipeline systems, especially above-
ground storage tanks, have common design and components to
their counterparts at other industrial plants such as reﬁneries.
Therefore the natech susceptibility and observed natech-related
damage modes are also not different. In addition to the incident
data originating from pipeline systems, which is limited in extent,
more widely available incident data from ﬁxed industrial plants can
be used to obtain more detailed information for such system parts
(Renni et al., 2010; Cozzani et al., 2010; Girgin, 2011; Krausmann
et al., 2011b; Cruz and Krausmann, 2013).
Earthquakes are generally regarded as a major threat to pipeline
systems, but the analysis shows that they rarely triggered accidents
in the U.S. hazardous liquid pipeline network. There is only one
triggering earthquake over a period of 40 years and it affected
solely a single pipeline system. Well established design criteria,
proper constructionmethods, and appropriate protectionmeasures
are presumably the reasons for the good earthquake performance.
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System can be considered as a good
example, which suffered onlyminor damage and no spill during the
2002 Denali Earthquake (MW 7.9) although the fault rupture
crossed the pipeline within a 500 m corridor and caused a shift of
about 4 m horizontally and 0.75 m vertically (USGS, 2003).
Besides directly triggering incidents, natural hazards can also
aggravate incidents by accelerating other causes, facilitating or
initiating transport of spilled materials that would otherwise stay
contained in a small area, or hindering response, recovery, and
clean-up operations which could otherwise happen more quickly.
Especially major natural disasters, such as tropical cyclones, may
result in competing resource needs for response activities. These
aggravating factors should also be considered while assessing
natural hazard impacts on pipeline systems.
Slow onset hazards and the time variant nature of some natural
hazards should be considered properly during the operational life
of pipeline systems, which is typically very long. In the U.S., there
are operational pipelines which were built over 100 years ago. Even
if natural hazard risks were considered at the time of the design
and construction of these systems, changes in the regional natural
hazard risks are very likely due to the large geographical extent of
the systems and also global factors, such as climate change.
Therefore, risk assessments and associated mitigation measures
should be periodically reviewed. This process should be regulated
by competent authorities, especially for pipelines passing through
high natural-hazard risk zones.
Besides data availability, data quality and explicit data limita-
tions are equally important and should be carefully evaluated. Even
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used during the period can create a bias in the data that needs to be
considered in the analysis. Although named similarly, exact deﬁ-
nitions of some data elements can also be different over time and
prevent overall clustering or aggregation. Ambiguities in the total
economic cost data due to changes in the PHMSA reporting criteria
is an example of this problem. The lack of speciﬁcation of natural
hazards as a cause in the 1968e1986 PHMSA data can also be given
as another example.
Following an incident, certain information, such as environ-
mental consequences and economic costs, cannot be obtained
quickly. In case of natechs, aggravating conditions due to the trig-
gering natural hazard may even hinder the collection of primary
information. However, data actuality and completeness is crucial
for a proper analysis and should be ensured by all responsible
parties. Pipeline operators should periodically update and complete
incident reports if previously unknown or more accurate infor-
mation becomes available, and competent authorities should
encourage and actively follow this process. Incomplete or outdated
information is difﬁcult to recognize by third parties, hence it cannot
be ﬁltered out easily from the analysis and may result in erroneous
conclusions. Cost estimates in the PHMSA data, which appear to be
signiﬁcantly underestimated for earlier time periods, are an
example.
During the study, a database and an analysis system were
developed for the systematic collection, classiﬁcation, and statis-
tical analysis of natech data related to pipeline systems. The data-
base, which is more complete than the original PHMSA dataset due
to data supplements from other sources in the course of this study,
is especially useful for providing case-speciﬁc natech data that is
scarce in the scientiﬁc literature and existing accident databases.
Although PHMSA data is limited to the U.S., further analysis with
respect to accident mechanisms and consequences will beneﬁt the
safety of pipeline systems also in other parts of the world where
similar natural hazards are common.
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